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Before I introduce some of Descartes' perspective into a 
discussion of Zeno's First Paradox of Motion, I would first like to 
restate in general what Zeno's First Paradox of Motion is. 
Essentially, Zeno says that, in order for motion from point A to 
point B to occur, one half of that distance must first be traveled. In 
order for one half of that distance to be traveled, one fourth of that 
distance must first be traveled, and in order for one fourth to be 
traveled, one eighth must be traveled, and so on ad infinitum. Since 
the distance to be traveled can be divided infinitely by the above 
process, it seemed to Zeno that it would be impossible to ever start 
traveling a given distance, and that ordinary motion is impossible: 
hence the Paradox. 
Descartes himself took a rather dim view of all those who 
discussed and tried to solve the First Paradox of Motion. His 
essential feeling on the matter was that: 
We should never enter into arguments about the infinite. 
Things in which we observe no limits...should be instead 
regarded as indefinite. Thus we will never be involved 
in tiresome arguments about the infinite. For since we 
are finite, it would be absurd for us to determine anything 
concerning the infinite; for this would be to attempt to 
limit it and grasp it.1 
Ironically, his viewpoint actually provides a starting point that 
I believe leads to a clearer, more satisfying solution to the Paradox 
than those that have been traditionally proposed. Descartes' 
objection to arguing about infinity, I believe, actually stems from a 
very important idea he expresses in his Meditations: the idea that 
only that which we can perceive "clearly and distinctly" do we 
know to be true. 2, 3 The concept of infinity has a certain fuzziness, 
a ragged edge. We cannot fully comprehend or visualize a series of 
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numbers that goes on forever. Therefore, we cannot perceive infinity 
clearly in mind's eye. Since the nature of infinity is such that it 
cannot be perceived "clearly and distinctly" by us, the only way in 
which Zeno's First Paradox of Motion can be discussed in a way 
acceptable to Descartes is if infinity is removed from the act of 
motion in the Paradox. I believe that it is not only possible to do 
this, but that the only way the Paradox can be sufficiently resolved 
is by removing infinity from it. Descartes' recommendation of only 
"clear and distinct" perceptions guides the effort at a real solution 
to the Paradox in this paper. In fact, this paper is an attempt to 
show that, by taking the Cartesian idea of "clear and distinct" 
perceptions to heart, the real solving of the Paradox can occur. 
Through the lens of "clear and distinct," it is eventually shown 
that the key to unraveling the Paradox lies in the way Zeno has 
conceived of the act of motion. All other attempts at solving the 
Paradox accept Zeno's misconception of the act of motion and try 
to solve the Paradox by manipulating Zeno's misrepresentation of 
what motion is. These solution attempts are never fully successful, 
based as they are on Zeno's mistake. 
It is important at this point to establish the criteria I will use 
throughout this paper for evaluating the soundness of a given 
solution to Zeno's First Paradox of Motion. Each criterion is either 
directly Cartesian or inspired by Cartesian principles. In order for 
a solution to the Paradox to be deemed acceptable in the course of 
this paper, it must: 
1) Be clear and distinct. That is, there must be no part of the 
solution that cannot be clearly perceived with mind's eye. 
2) Reconcile our mathematical and physical perceptions. 
Many attempted solutions of the Paradox address either 
our mathematical perceptions of motion, as in the infinite 
geometric series solution, or our physical perceptions of 
motion, as in Aristotle's solution to the Paradox, but not 
both. Since both our mathematical and physical perceptions 
are capable of being clear and distinct enough to reveal 
truths to us, a truly acceptable, well-rounded solution would 
address both, and would reconcile them. 
3) Not alter concepts such as infinity, time, or distance in 
an attempt to resolve the Paradox. If the definitions of 
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these words are changed, a discussion of clear and distinct 
perceptions becomes impossible, as the words have lost 
their usefulness as references to the concepts in question. 
More importantly, if changed, the words would then mean 
different things than they would have meant to Zeno, and 
they could no longer be an appropriate part of the argument 
at hand. Many attempted solutions to the Paradox are guilty 
of concept altering in their pursuit of the solution, 
Benacceraf and Thomson's proposed solutions being but 
two examples. 
Before I begin applying these criteria to specific solutions 
proposed for Zeno's First Paradox of Motion, I would first like to 
establish that the need for a better solution still exists, despite the 
age of the Paradox. Secondly, I intend to show that the solution 
attempts that do exist do not meet the established criteria. Lastly, I 
would like to put forth my own solution, and demonstrate that my 
solution does meet the established criteria. I will proceed through 
each of these in turn. 
Establishing The Need for A Better Solution to the Paradox 
Although this particular Paradox was born approximately two 
thousand years ago, even the most recent attempts at it have not 
been deemed wholly satisfying. It can be said very truthfully that 
even in the 21st century, despite our advanced mathematical 
apparatus such as infinite geometric series formulae and differential 
calculus, we have not yet reached a simple consensus on the 
problem. Attempts continue to be made, of course. But the fact 
that papers with widely differing viewpoints on the Paradox are 
still being written suggests that a generally accepted perspective 
on its resolution is still absent. In the introduction to his collection 
of essays on the subject, Wesley Salmon notes that Zeno's Paradoxes 
are sometimes viewed as "mere anachronisms" which would only 
disturb someone with an inadequate knowledge of calculus. But, 
as Salmon says, "no evaluation could be further from the truth." 4 , 5 
Salmon is careful to point out that all the widely varying views of 
the Paradox in his collection come from "mathematically literate 
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twentieth-century authors." 6 Even the sophisticated mathematics 
of modern day, many of these authors seem to agree, can't resolve 
the metaphysical issues of motion. As one such author, J.O. 
Wisdom, suggests: "We do not eliminate the Paradox until we have 
seen in what way it fails as a description."7 R. M. Sainsbury states 
the matter more specifically in his book Paradoxes when he says, 
"a full response to Zeno's Racetrack Paradox would require a 
detailed elaboration and justification of our spatial concepts." 8 
The main reason that solutions that have been proposed for 
Zeno's First Paradox have not been considered satisfactory by one 
group or another, it appears, is because in each case the proposed 
solution for the Paradox contains ambiguities. Each proposed 
solution contains a part that cannot be seen clearly in mind's eye. 
A truly satisfying solution—for any problem—has no such parts. 
Before I present my own approach to this ancient problem, let us 
briefly revisit the origins of the First Paradox of Motion, examine 
the solutions to this Paradox that have been proposed so far, and 
determine how these solutions measure up to the three criteria 
proposed. 
Parmenides 
The Parmenidian approach to space and time is surely the core 
around which Zeno's First Paradox of Motion is wrapped. The 
Parmenidian view of time is important to Zeno's First Paradox of 
Motion because Parmenides' thinking about time left its mark on 
Zeno, who in Charles Sanders Peirce's words was "the pupil and 
defender of Parmenides." 9 Bertrand Russell 1 0 and others believe 
that Zeno's primary goal in creating the First Paradox of Motion is 
to uphold Parmenides' view that our usual conceptions of space 
and time—our conceptions of space as a procession of discrete 
distances and of time as a procession of discrete moments—are 
false. Summarizing the Parmenidian view of time, Ronald Hoy 
says, "Parmenides finds fault with beliefs about time and argues 
that time is not real." 1 1 In terms of our three criteria, we must reject 
the view that time is not real, because our physical perception is 
that time is real and that it does pass (criterion #2). The reasons for 
rejecting the view that time is not real, however, are not simple. To 
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wit: Parmenides believed that a temporal existence was not possible 
because, in his view, we exist only in a "durationless now," where 
we are always in the present in space and time. His belief in the 
durationless now does not seem entirely unwarranted, as all of us 
who exist feel that we are experiencing events "now," as opposed 
to ten minutes ago, a year ago, or a year in the future. Oddly, if 
time is truly passing, our sense of being in the "now" should not 
persist—and yet, it does. Perhaps we are the lens through which 
time passes, but we feel the basic persistence of ourselves. On the 
other hand, we also feel that we are different today than we were 
many years ago—having adult thoughts as opposed to childish ones, 
for instance—suggesting that even our "now" is not untouched by 
time. Similarly, our personal perception of the "durationless now" 
begins after our conception, and so our own "durationless now" 
seems to exist in a specific location in time. Recent evidence also 
suggests that perhaps our sense of the durationless now is really an 
illusion. Ilya Färber and Patricia Churchland note in The Cognitive 
Neurosciences that there is considerable empirical support to 
suggest that, "when we experience ourselves as having made a 
conscious decision, what we are in fact getting is a "story" 
reconstructed from the (external and internal) evidence." 1 2 In 
addition, as Brenda Rapp notes in The Handbook of Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, it is known that the brain does not process 
experiences instantaneously, so whatever it is we perceive as "now" 
was several milliseconds ago or more . 1 3 In other words, it seems 
likely that the "durationless now" has some dependence on time. 
If it cannot be disputed that time has bearings on the durationless 
now, the nature of time was nevertheless under dispute until 
recently. In Parmenides' day, time was often regarded as cyclical. 
In modern times, the idea that time is linear no longer seems 
contestable. As G J. Whitrow explains in The Nature of Time, 
"The linear view of time as continual progression without cyclical 
repetition finally prevailed through the influence of the nineteenth-
century biological evolutionists." 1 4 He continues, "The Darwinian 
theory of biological evolution.. .was the decisive factor that caused 
men to become conscious of the time aspect of the universe." 1 5 
Specifically, because some species proliferate, others die out, and 
organisms in general become better adapted to their environments 
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and more complex, "the chances of retracing the steps of evolution 
decrease rapidly" the longer the evolutionary process continues. 1 6 
Parmenides, however, did not have the benefit of modern 
knowledge. As Hoy says, "Today, it is easy to ignore Parmenides' 
rejection of t imc . I t is obvious time is real." 1 7 
If it must be conceded that time is real, however, we are not 
yet finished with Parmenides, as we have not yet shown how time 
and/or motion can be real, though the issues of the reality of time 
and motion (i.e. the traveling of a distance) are related. The crux of 
the issue is the question of how it is possible for a "whole" infinite 
quantity like time or distance to be divided into discrete units, so 
that time can be traveled and distance can be crossed. In Zeno's 
scenario, both must be infinitely divided before a unit of time can 
pass, or a unit of distance can be traveled. The First Paradox of 
Motion itself is said to arise largely because the smallest— 
indivisible—unit of distance or time must have fixed dimensions 
so that the units summed may add up to the total distance or time, 
and yet each unit must not have fixed dimensions so that it may be 
divided infinitely, as any distance or time seemingly can be. This 
results in what is commonly referred to as a plurality: each unit of 
distance or time must assume the impossible burden of being, in 
Salmon's words, "both large and small. So small as to have no 
magnitude, so large as to be infinite." 1 8 Salmon's observation 
hearkens back to Aristotle's statement about the inscrutableness of 
any seemingly infinite thing, namely that: "The infinite body must 
be either (1) compound, or (2) simple; yet neither alternative is 
possible." 1 9 Hence the basic source of contradiction in motion for 
Parmenides and his supporters. As Peirce says of Parmenides' pupil, 
Zeno: "It was an axiom with Zeno that cont inui ty is 
incomprehensible, and therefore false." 2 0 Regardless of our 
complicated mathematical ruminations on the space/ t ime 
continuum, however, in the physical world, motion from here to 
there occurs routinely and with ease. The Parmenidian explanation 
of motion says that motion only appears simple; our mental 
perception says that Parmenidian belief cannot be correct because 
it does not match our experience (a simple, fluid motion). Such a 
disconnection of explanation and observation would be a violation 
of criterion #2, if the Parmenidian position were an attempt at a 
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solution to the Paradox, rather than a possible origin of the Paradox 
itself. When our mathematical explanations match what we actually 
experience, then, we feel intuitively, we have arrived at the correct 
view of motion. The Parmenidian approach says, essentially, "this 
Paradox cannot be resolved," and yet a body resolves the Paradox 
every time it moves! The disparity between the physical world and 
the mathematical world is great in the Parmenidian view of time 
and space. So great, a different approach to space, time, and motion 
is hoped for. Unfortunately, these different approaches bring with 
them different problems, as will be reviewed. 
Distance and Supertasks 
A possible approach to the solution of the First Paradox of 
Motion is generated when the question is asked, "what does it mean 
to travel a distance in Zeno's scenario?" James Thomson designates 
the task in this case (defined as traveling an infinite distance) as a 
"supertask," indicating by the label that it is beyond normal reach. 2 1 
He discards the notion that traveling this distance is a "supertask" 
in the course of things, but because infinity is never removed from 
his view of the situation, the reasons behind his conclusion are 
difficult to perceive clearly. He uses a lamp apparatus, for instance, 
to try to pin down infinity. Proposing a switch which turns the 
lamp on and off (the "distance" in this case is the distance the 
switch must be moved from "of f to "on"), he claims that after any 
number of switchings—even an infinite number—we can be 
confident of the outcome: the lamp will be on or off.22 The finite 
series conclusion and the "infinite series" conclusion in Thomson's 
scenario are the same. The similar conclusion of the two series— 
as well as some other points Thomson offers up—are ultimately 
supposed to suggest that "a man who completes a journey completes 
an infinite number of journeys." 2 3 The problem with this solution, 
of course, is that infinity is not truly being represented. No one 
could ever finish an infinite series of lamp switches, meaning that 
Thomson's solution violates criterion #3 . Infinity is a special 
concept that is useful precisely because the idea it contains—that 
of a succession of elements without end—is not covered by any 
other concept. Since Thomson altered his idea of infinity in a 
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fundamental way, a way that resulted in his reaching an end of a 
proposed "infinite" series, he changed what the concept of infinity 
meant and it no longer referred to the same infinity discussed in 
the Paradox—hence the criterion #3 violation. Thomson's lamp 
scenario also violates criterion #1 , because at the ceiling rate at 
which the theoretical switching could be occuring, 2 4 it is even 
possible that the lamp would not stay in a state long enough to be 
called "o f f or "on." It may very well occupy a third, intermediate 
state most of the time: "off-on." We cannot say with confidence 
what the state of the lamp is, because we cannot completely visualize 
it. We cannot, therefore, make it comply with criterion # 1. In another 
attempt to pin down infinity via his conception of distance, 
Thomson tries to make an analogy between a unit of distance and 
a lump of chocolate, saying if you divide chocolate long enough 
you'll go smaller than the molecular level and you no longer have 
chocolate. 2 5 I agree there cannot be a "chocolate atom." Still, 
distance can be divided in mind's eye without reaching an instant 
where we can say, "That is not a distance, it is a separate thing 
which we can call by another name." However, according to some, 
such as Grünbaum, 2 6 distance can be reduced this way—to an entity 
with no length in any of the three dimensions, i.e. a point. This 
reduction of a line to a point is, for example, against conventional 
Euclidean thinking, which says that only lines can comprise larger 
lines. Grünbaum explicitly states the geometric paradox that cannot 
be avoided in the approach under discussion: if a line consists of 
points, one should be able to add up these points and arrive at a 
line length. But points have no length. 2 7 Nevertheless, the points 
must have magnitude in order to be compounded. However, as 
Owen points out, if a thing has no dimensions its location cannot 
be fixed, and it does not exist. 2 8 Or perhaps, more accurately, since 
we cannot clearly and distinctly perceive a point (we cannot clearly 
visualize something with no length), we cannot say that it definitely 
exists. The point has a "where" to use Aristotle's categories, but 
not a "position," since it has no magnitude. A collection of points 
"added" cannot be made into a distance, seeing as how zero 
dimension, however many times you add it, will not equal a distance. 
Some have taken this as proof of the Paradox involved in motion. 
I think it merely shows that distance is a real quantity that does 
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exist, and that the point, whose location cannot be defined, does 
not necessarily exist. We cannot clearly and distinctly perceive a 
point, as any representation we make of a point, on paper or 
otherwise, we must make by drawing, or thinking of, a small line. 
Like Euclidean geometrical figures, the point may also very well 
have no physical or sensible parallel. Hence, the "point" may not 
be a valid concept to introduce into ordinary space, which involves 
distances with fixed location: that is, distances that exist. It seems 
that we are invoking the observation of Salmon: "Systems of pure 
mathematics, as such, involve primitive terms which have no 
physical reference whatever." 2 9 The "physical reference," that is, a 
way of describing ordinary physical motion in such a way that it 
does not create internal paradoxes, is what we aim to resolve. 
Black, on the other hand, tries to deal with the popular juggling 
of the physical and mathematical distances by claiming that an 
infinite mathematical distance does not apply to ordinary distance 
involved in motion, even though the general consensus is that 
ordinary distance is infinitely divisible (a violation of criterion #2). 3 0 
Wisdom also tries to deal with the math/physical distance split in 
the same unfortunate way, when he states: "saying Achilles' 
distance to travel is l+l/2+1/4+...etc. and saying Achilles' distance 
is physical is contradictory."3 1 Also, "it is impossible," Wisdom 
says, "to subdivide the distance between [the points] without 
altering the assigned size of the points." 3 2 But it should not be 
impossible for these distances to coexist. Mathematics was invented 
partly to describe and predict physical reality. The one should 
illuminate the other; each has that power. So we must turn to yet 
another approach. 
Supertasks and Infinite Motion Machines 
Black and Thomson's notion of "supertasks" contains the idea 
that the overcoming of the distance by the runner can only be 
achieved through use of extraordinary methods. In many treatments, 
these methods involve people or things that can perform infinite 
tasks, such as the infinite motion machines discussed by 
Poundstone: the Peano machine and the pi machine. 3 3 But such 
devices can't be satisfactory for solving the Paradox because they 
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are—let's face it—not required for ordinary motion (violations of 
criterion #2). But when it is believed that ordinary motion involves 
infinite division, such fantastic apparatus becomes common in 
attempts at solutions. In addition to the infinity machines, there 
are other fantastic conceptions, such as Russell 's medically 
impossible example of a person who improves at a task until it 
takes him no time to do it, 3 4 and Benacerraf's genie who shrinks 
until it allegedly disappears at 1, 3 5 to name but two. None of these, 
however, can be clearly perceived, and so they are violations of 
criterion #1 . As to Russell's, we can't clearly conceive of a person 
taking no time at all to do a task: The tasks we know have a distinct 
beginning and end. As to Benacceraf's, at the very moment the 
genie is supposed to disappear, our otherwise clear vision of the 
scenario dims. We can't "see" the genie disappearing. We do not 
know: he might still be there, only just beyond our field of vision. 
For all we can perceive, he may be hiding like the Paramecium— 
in plain view. We surely hope for a better resolution than this. 
Time 
Another way of approaching the problem of infinity is to 
manipulate notions of time (these are of course bound up with 
attempts at manipulating notions of distance). One attempt is that 
of Sainsbury 3 6 and Black, 3 7 who claim that, like a finite distance, a 
finite block of time consists of an infinite number of subdivisions. 
Therefore, according to this reasoning, a person completes an 
infinite number of journeys when he completes one finite journey. 
The problem with this view is that a body does not experience time 
in this way—this fact conflicts with criterion #2 . A body 
experiences a moment in a moment: it never finds itself "unable to 
finish" a moment. The basic idea of infinity rests on a body's sense 
that it is doing something/orever. If that sense is lost, true infinity 
is no longer being discussed (criterion #3). Yet if time is real, then 
motion must be real. And if motion is real...the problem of resolving 
the apparent Paradox of Zeno's is still important and infinity must 
be subdued somehow. It seems that the concept of infinity is not 
preserved in Sainsbury and Black's approach. A real solution to 
this Paradox should integrate all the pertinent facts known about 
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motion. Sainsbury and Black's perspective will hopefully be 
superseded by an explanation for which the common notion of 
infinity is preserved. Grünbaum mentions that clock measures are 
"finitely additive" like distances, 3 8 however, like distances, if time 
is to be accounted for here, the idea of infinity must be invoked but 
the numerable/denumerable disparity still exists. 
Salmon 3 9 points out that before the 19th century, there was 
doubt about whether a function could "move" to reach its limit. 
Today, the limit is simply regarded as a number, not a destination, 
and there is no mystery about reaching it. However, since the 
drawing of the function is merely a representation of the purely 
mathematical and is not meant to be an instance of physical motion, 
this modern view of the function is not terribly important to our 
concerns with Zeno. There are no "time-consuming" instants in 
the paper world of the function. The problem with physical motion 
is that the instants and pieces of time, already popularly defined to 
be infinite in number, must occur one at a time, hence the usual 
conundrum, as there is no infinite amount of time for the motion to 
occur in. Grünbaum's peculiar concept of "durationless" instants 
is introduced to solve this problem, 4 0 but it does not follow criterion 
#2—we cannot say with confidence that something like a 
durationless instant has any real physical meaning—as Owen says, 
a truly durationless instant does not exist. (The idea of "durationless 
instant" must be distinguished from Parmenides ' idea of 
"durat ionless now," which refers to a be ing ' s seemingly 
transcendental sense of being in the "now," which, nevertheless, 
must exist in time, as the instant the being has experienced has 
traveled from the future, to the present, to the past before a being 
has even perceived it, as discussed previously.) Concepts like the 
"durationless instant" fail to make infinity, not to mention ordinary 
motion, any less murky. In fact, they add to the general lack of 
clarity surrounding the concept, since we can' t visualize a 
"durationless instant" clearly (criterion #1). 
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Grappling With Infinity 
Black 4 1 makes the claim that only a finite space and time are 
needed for the runner to make an infinite series of steps. Of course, 
this doesn't preserve the usual concept of infinity. We cannot see 
clearly, visualize with mind's eye, how an infinite progression of 
steps might be contained in a finite one. As was previously 
mentioned, Black also claims that there is a distinction between 
numbers and physical distances.4 2 Here, Black seems to be violating 
criterion #2. However, the connection between numbers and 
physical distances should exist, as Zeno was nevertheless capable 
of stating his First Paradox in terms of physical space. Another 
attempt at neutralizing infinity was Grünbaum's, wherein he reports 
a particular proof strategy—originating with Cantor—which states 
that two infinite collections are equinumerous if each member of 
one can be paired with another.4 3 This strategy is supposed to allow 
us to evaluate the size of infinite series, making it possible for us to 
gauge if one such series is bigger or smaller than another. But, if 
we are using the usual definition of infinity, both infinite series are 
equally inscrutable. Criterion #1 is again a problem. Harold Lee, 
although not finding the satisfying solution which is craved, at 
least properly acknowledges the problem, hence providing the first 
step to an appropriate resolution: "Mathematical techniques are 
adequate to deal with the situations of which [Zeno's] paradoxes 
treat, but philosophers have hastened to argue that the techniques 
are merely elaborate ways of avoiding the rational problem Zeno 
raises. The philosophers are correct." 4 4 He continues, "Zeno's 
analysis, however, divides space and t imc.and this division has 
no last term. But actual motion has a point of arriving, a last term." 4 5 
He then tries to neutralize infinity by claiming that Zeno's use of a 
certain "type" of number is not appropriate for the racetrack 
scenario: "The series of real numbers is a linear continuum, and 
every rational has a "place" in the series, but the reals do not 
"include" the rationals in a literal sense, for the rationals and the 
reals are not defined in the same way." 4 6 Rational numbers are 
those which can be expressed as a whole number or whole number 
fraction, whereas real numbers can be rational or irrational numbers 
(irrational numbers being inexpressible as whole numbers or whole 
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number fractions, an example being the square root of 3). The real 
series does not "include" the rationals or irrationals in the sense 
that the linear continuum of real numbers proceeds from, say, 1 to 
4, without the explicit acknowledgement of all of the exact numbers 
in between (pi, for example, cannot be exactly defined, but this 
does not mean that the real number series cannot move to 3.142 
and beyond). He says further that: "the series of rational numbers 
is a dense series; that is, between every two elements there is another 
element."4 7 However, real distances seem broad enough in definition 
to encompass both types of numbers. As Aristotle points out, 
distances are "infinitely divisible," leaving room for both real and 
rational numbers. Even if we accept the notion that these two types 
of numbers are truly different, we still come no closer to describing 
infinity and motion clearly. But Lee has another approach, wherein 
he tries subdue the infinity in the Paradox by claiming there are 
two different kinds of infinity: "In terms of an analysis based on 
the Cantor-Dedekind theories, the first two of Zeno's paradoxes 
stem from the failure to discriminate between a denumerable infinity 
composed of discrete elements and a not denumerable infinity 
composed of continuous elements." 4 8 Of course, the essential idea 
of infinity rests on the similarity of these two infinities: each remains 
inscrutable in mind's eye (a violation of criterion #1). Nevertheless, 
Lee attempts to make infinity more manageable by altering its usual 
definition (against criterion #3). On a gentler note, Lee concludes 
that, "Zeno's analysis is not incorrect in the sense of being totally 
wrong. It is incorrect only in the sense of being incomplete." Lee 
believes that Zeno is merely using the wrong model, that of the 
"pseudo-continuum." 4 9 "This is not to say that continuity is 
unanalysable, but only that the adequate analysis is not made in 
terms of discrete parts." 5 0 And Lee, inspired by Dedekind, says, 
"the best way...of dealing with a continuum is...not to interpret a 
continuum as a synthesis of separately given elements or parts." 5 1 
But this continuum must contain discrete elements, since we can 
travel and speak about one stretch of distance, such as three yards, 
an inch, or an angstrom, while excluding another on each side of 
that distance. So, we must hope for another approach to the Paradox. 
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Leibniz 
Leibniz, too, grappled with the idea of infinity without complete 
success (an outcome Descartes would have viewed as predictable). 
He seemed to think, however, that we intuitively understand what 
infinity means, even though we cannot perceive it clearly and 
distinctly. As he says, through the role of Ariste in his fictional 
Conversation ofPhilarite and Ariste, "The mind does not see the 
infinite in the sense that it measures the infinite by its thought. 
However, it is not enough that the end not be in sight, for the mind 
could hope to find this end; but the mind understands that there is 
no such end. This is how geometers see...the asymptotic lines of 
the hyperbola, which they know can never intersect it, though they 
approach it without end." 5 2 Philarete (who plays the part of Leibniz 
in the conversation) responds, "This way of knowing the infinite is 
certain and incontestable...But though we can conclude from it 
that there is no ultimate finite whole, it still does not follow that 
we see a complete infinite thing." 5 3 Leibniz agrees with Descartes, 
therefore, that something infinite cannot be perceived clearly. 
Leibniz's reasons for believing that infinity cannot be clearly 
perceived are different, however. Descartes thought that because 
of our finite nature we could not really grasp infinity; Leibniz 
thought that God—in his infinite wisdom—was able to pass on to 
us finite beings enough of a sense of infinity to know its essential 
properties. 5 4 The fact that no infinite line could be clearly 
represented could also be shown with our finite, human, 
mathematical knowledge. As Catherine Wilson notes in her 
Leibniz's metaphysics: A historical and comparative study, Leibniz 
employed a demonstration where he drew a line, then drew a 
diagonal line that intersected the first. Lines could be dropped from 
points on the original line to points on its diagonal, but clearly the 
diagonal was always longer. How then, could both lines contain 
the same (infinite) number of points? As Wilson summarizes the 
results of this demonstration: "A continuous line, Leibniz 
recognized, could not be generated from infinitesimals, if these 
were represented as extensionless points." 5 5 Wilson continues, "One 
might conclude that the composition of the mathematical continuum 
was an insoluble problem, but allow that the calculus was 
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nevertheless a success in operation...Outside the realm of pure 
mathematics, however, this instrumentalist approach was not very 
satisfactory." 5 6 She continues, "Certain metaphysical problems 
appear to presuppose a solution to the composition problem, notably 
the problems of change and motion.. .This puzzle is then perceived 
to lead rapidly into Zeno's paradoxes and so into the labyrinth of 
the continuum." 5 7 Leibniz also felt that only part of motion was 
real, the part which is force or power. As Wilson reports, this view 
of motion is something Leibniz believed he had recognized about 
the true nature of motion that Zeno did not recognize. 5 8 Of course, 
our own mental perceptions of ordinary motion counteract the idea 
that motion isn't completely real (criterion #2). 
The Geometric Series Solution 
Before I propose my own take on this rather durable 
conundrum, I would like to dispel whatever part of the myth which 
might still remain in the reader's mind that the "sum of the geometric 
series" solution is satisfactory, as Benson Mates 5 9 and others 
suggested some time ago. The idea of the geometric series solution 
is that the distance a runner travels can ultimately be described as 
the sum of an infinite geometric series where S= 1 + x + x 2...= 1/ 
(1-x), |x|< 1. In this expression, " S " is the total distance the runner 
hopes to travel, which equals 2. The variable "x," the geometric 
ratio, equals 1/2. Mathematically, Zeno's scenario fits neatly, and 
the sum is reached. This solution, however, is not as tidy as it 
appears. In order for the geometric series solution to be appropriate, 
the series must have a common geometric ratio. 6 0 In this case, Zeno 
gives it as 1/2. Nevertheless, the concept of the Paradox is 
completely preserved even if the ratio isn't the same for each 
imaginary division. If, rather than taking the original distance, 
dividing it in half, then dividing the resulting distance in half, etc., 
we divided the original distance in half, then the next distance into 
fourths, then the next distance into thirds, etc., the same problem 
of infinite divisibility would arise. And yet, with the common ratio 
absent, the geometrical series solution could no longer apply. It is 
possible, of course, for us to be charitable and say that this solution 
works mathematically (for indeed there is a situation where it does: 
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x=l/2), and to bring the proposed solution to the next level, at 
which we try to use it to describe real, physical motion. But if we 
do this, the solution rends itself again—it would be impossible to 
divide any physical distance exactly in half, and we are once again 
confronting the previous scenario where we do not have a common 
geometric ratio, x. Even if we still accept the geometric series 
solution at this point, we must nevertheless recognize that the 
solution is vague at some points which are very important to real 
motion: it says nothing about time—i.e., how long it would take 
for an infinite series to converge-and it says nothing about whether 
the series actually reaches its limit, or whether it simply gets closer 
and closer to the limit—the actual reaching of the limit being a 
mathematical assumption. This lack of clarity is important for the 
reason cited by Wittgenstein; it adds up to a certain intellectual 
shortcoming which confounds our attempts to see the matter of 
infinity in a clear light: "Queer: when one takes [an infinite series] 
as a matter of course...it loses its whole paradoxical aspect...it is as 
if I were to be told: Don't worry, this series goes on without ever 
stopping. We are as it were excused the labor of thinking of an 
end." 6 1 We simply can't completely visualize the convergence of 
an infinite series, so we really don't know that it does reach its 
limit, and the geometric series solution must then contain a violation 
of criterion #1 . It may also contain a violation of criterion #3, for if 
an infinite series were truly represented as infinite, it would not 
end. Lastly, even if we still believe in the infinite geometric series 
solution at this point, there is still the question of whether this 
series applies to real motion. Is real motion a converging infinite 
series, as Zeno represents it—meaning that it contains the problem 
of an infinite quantity converging in a finite time—or is it more 
like a divergent series, which is has no pre-determinable limit? I 
believe it is the latter, and my reasons for this appear in my own 
solution to the Paradox. Aristotle also had a few choice words to 
say about this very matter. 
Aristotle 
Aristotle made some rather useful observations about Zeno's 
First Paradox. Many solutions proposed by authors in this paper 
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owe their origins to Aristotle's way of thinking. Unfortunately, 
Aristotle also attempted to explain Zeno's First Paradox of Motion 
without removing infinity from it first. As Sir Ross sums up 
Aristotle's beliefs concerning the Paradox, "The essence of his 
reply [to the First Paradox of Motion] is that, while it is impossible 
to traverse an infinite space in a finite time, it is possible to traverse 
an infinitely divisible space in a finite time, since a finite time is 
itself infinitely divisible." 6 21 suppose there can be no disagreement 
with this basic assertion, except that we experience neither the 
infinite divisibility of time nor infinite divisibility of distance in 
ordinary motion (criterion #2). Aristotle himself seemed to sense 
this, as he says in Physics that each distance seems to contain an 
infinite number of segments, but that the infinite number of these 
segments is not an "essential" characteristic of the distance, but 
rather an "accidental" one. 6 3 However, Aristotle does not make it 
entirely clear how this result can follow. If the infinite nature of a 
distance (i.e. the fact that a distance can undergo division infinitely) 
is a characteristic of it, how does this characteristic get demoted 
from "essential" to "accidental"? Perhaps it is because Aristotle 
doesn't believe Zeno's assumption that we must divide distances 
in order to cross them. Aristotle makes the promising observation 
that "though what is continuous contains an infinite number of 
halves, they are not actual but potential halves. If the halves are 
made actual, we shall get not a continuous but an intermittent 
motion." 6 4 He continues, "Therefore to the question whether it is 
possible to pass through an infinite number of units either of time 
or of distance we must reply that in a sense it is and in a sense it is 
not. If the units are actual, it is not possible: if they are potential, it 
is possible." 6 5 In other words, if I travel a distance, and I then try to 
divide the distance in half, then divide that distance in half, etc., it 
will seem as though the distance has an infinite property and that it 
would never have been possible to start traveling the distance. 
However, if I say that I cannot divide a distance that I have traveled 
until I have already traveled it (that is, until the "potential" or 
untraveled distance becomes "actual" because I have traveled it), I 
have removed the entire problem of the infinite divisibility of the 
distance—the problem of "starting" the motion. I think Aristotle's 
observation here is very important. Aristotle, however, did not seem 
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to think said observation was very important, as he does not bother 
to explain it in detail. And, not only does he fail to emphasize it in 
the Physics, he continues on after the observation into a discourse 
on "becoming," which really is solvable using the same, simple 
observation. That is, if we refuse to recognize the final form of the 
object until it has reached that final form, we cannot enter into a 
debate about at what moment in its transformation it has reached 
that final form. I, on the other hand, think that Aristotle's "potential" 
versus "actual" distance observation is very important, and in fact 
I use it as a step in my clear and distinct solution, which follows. 
A Clear and Distinct Solution 
To arrive at a clear and distinct solution to the First Paradox of 
Motion, we must first begin in a position of doubt. Not in a position 
of fundamental doubt, such as that adopted by Descartes at the 
beginning of the Meditations, but in a position of doubt where we 
accept that one thing is true, the clear and distinct perceptions of 
our minds, and nothing else. 
Now that we are in a position where we are no longer assuming 
anything about the First Paradox, let us begin at its most obvious 
part: the language in which it is couched. We must turn our attention 
to the fact that the very phrasing of Zeno's Racetrack Paradox 
seems to have caused some difficulties which have mislead thinkers 
over the centuries in their attempts at valid solutions. The x = 1/2 
of the geometric solution is but the first example where the 
description of the Paradox causes obstacles to reaching the heart 
of the matter. Of course, Zeno is not necessarily to blame—all our 
sources of the Paradox are second-hand fragments at best. 
But let us work with what we have. The phrasing attributed to 
Zeno says that, before a runner can traverse the distance of the 
racetrack, he must traverse 1/2 the distance, before he can do that, 
he must traverse 1/2 of 1/2 the distance, etc. Yet this is only an 
attempt at describing a process of infinite division by 1/2. We know 
by our own clear and distinct perceptions of motion that this infinite 
division is not an accurate phrasing of the actual situation 
encountered by a moving body. In fact, for such a body, the actual 
geometric series is exactly backward. Thomson has already pointed 
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out that the correct sequence order for the distance in Zeno's 
paradox is in the direction of 0 to 1/2 to 1, rather than supporting 
the usual view that it is 1 to 1/2 to 0, but he fails to make anything 
pivotal of it. 6 6 However, something pivotal does result from this 
view, as I will show. 
Zeno begins his series at the completed distance. An actual 
body at the start of movement is at zero. The body adds 1/8 to its 
distance traveled, then 1/4, then 1/2, etc., then ultimately a total 
distance of some kind (usually referred to as whole number, such 
as 1 or 2) is reached. Zeno divides the total distance in his series by 
1/2, then 1/4, then 1/8, etc., so rather than gaining distance, his 
series is always losing it: the exact opposite of what a moving body 
does. As was previously stated, Aristotle portrays the series Zeno 
pictures as infinite, but that is only because Zeno's visualization of 
it proceeds in the direction of decrease. 
Actual Situation Zeno's Visualization 
start direction of finish 
infinite series/ 
direction of 
motion 
start direction of 
infinite series/ 
direction of 
motion 
finish 
Nevertheless, Zeno proceeds to divide the total distance by a series 
of halves, never running out of distance that can be halved, and 
therefore claims that, since these distances can never be halved to 
completion, the runner can never get started. Hence the Paradox. 
All agree that Zeno has failed to describe the simple, fluid motion 
that we physically experience. But all do not agree as to why his 
idea of motion fails to coincide with natural motion. I believe that 
his idea of motion deviated from real motion as soon as he visualized 
the situation. The problem is not mathematical , quantum-
mechanical, or Parmenidian. The problem is the picture in his head. 
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I believe that when we combine Aristotle's observations of the 
"accidental" and "essential" properties of the distance to be traveled, 
Aristotle's distinction of "potential" and "actual" distances, 
Thomson's observation of the real direction of the sequence (in 
the direction of 0 to 1), and Bergson's comment, where he notes 
that "the possibility of applying the movement (of the runner) to 
the line traversed exists only for an observer who...tries to 
reconstruct the real movement," 6 7 we are on our way to finding the 
truth about Zeno's First Paradox. 
I take this view a step further, claiming that the "line traversed" 
doesn't exist in Zeno's setup of the Paradox. There is no "distance 
traveled" until the runner has actually traveled it. Because this 
distance only arises after the runner's movement, it does not have 
a fixed value. It can be assigned any value at all, until the runner 
has completed it (the runner has ceased motion), at which point it 
has a specific value. Before the runner has traveled, the "distance 
traveled" is mere speculation. To put this idea in other terms, the 
distance traveled cannot be expressed as a fixed sum, such as 1 or 
2, or in the infinite geometric series solution, S, before the runner 
has moved it. Before the distance has been traveled, it is unbounded. 
It cannot be expressed as a finite length until it has been traveled, 
at which point the motion has already occurred, and there is no 
"Paradox of Motion" to be had. If the series were infinite, as it 
seems to be proceeding in the direction of infinite increase rather 
than in the direction of infinite decrease in Zeno's scenario, we 
must admit that it has no bound, like any other infinite increasing 
series. When the motion ceases, however, the series is halted, and 
a limit is reached—the series is no longer infinite, as it describes 
real motion, which has a point of arriving. We have eliminated the 
problem of the convergence of an infinite series. And here we come 
to Zeno's basic error in describing this situation, and the general 
problem inherent in anyone's solution that relies on Zeno's 
description of the runner and the distance. 
We see, then, that this approach to the Paradox is the only kind 
that does not contain the usual thorniness. It is clear and distinct, 
which fulfills criterion #1 . It has no parts that cannot be perceived 
by mind's eye. It reconciles our physical and mathematical 
perceptions, which fulfills criterion #2. It also does not change the 
ZENO'S FIRST PARADOX OF MOTION 133 
usual definition of infinity, time, distance, or any such concepts in 
an attempt at resolving the Paradox, which fulfills criterion #3. All 
the criteria, therefore, have been met. 
This Paradox, I think, shows us how important visualization is 
in problem solving. The one part of Zeno's perspective that everyone 
used when analyzing Zeno's First Paradox was Zeno's own 
visualization of motion. Everyone trusted that he had at least framed 
the basic situation correctly. Since Zeno's visualization was 
incorrect, no one could come up with a clear solution to the problem. 
And so the problem remained. It remained long enough to 
exasperate Descartes. It remained long enough to cause many 
mathematicians and philosophers pause. But now, hopefully, the 
troublesome nature of this Paradox has been fully answered. 
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